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Fair Exchange of Digital Signatures  
using RSA-based CEMBS and Offline STTP 
 
Jamal A. Hussein, Mumtaz A. AlMukhtar 
 
Abstract—One of the essential security services needed to safeguard online transactions is fair exchange. In fair exchange protocols two 
parties can exchange their signatures in a fair manner, so that either each party gain the other’s signature or no one obtain anything useful. 
This paper examines security solutions for achieving fair exchange. It proposes new security protocols based on the "Certified Encrypted 
Message Being Signature" (CEMBS) by using RSA signature scheme. This protocol relies on the help of an "off-line Semi-Trusted Third 
Party" (STTP) to achieve fairness. They provide with confidential protection from the STTP for the exchanged items by limiting the role and 
power of the STTP. Three different protocols have been proposed. In the first protocol, the two main parties exchange their signatures on a 
common message. In the second protocol, the signatures are exchanged on two different messages. While in the third one, the exchange is 
between confidential data and signature. 
Index Terms—Fair Exchange, Digital Signatures, Cryptography, RSA, DSA, GQ, ElGamal. 
——————————   ?   —————————— 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
HE third party is necessary in fair exchange protocols, 
the fairness can not be guaranteed without help of the 
third party. The third party may be online, i.e. involved 
in each transaction to help each party to gain the others 
signature, or it may be offline, i.e. it involved only when an 
problem occur while the two main parties try to exchange 
their signatures, in this case the third part help to recovering 
the signatures. Furthermore, the third party may be full 
trusted (TTP) or semi trusted (STTP), trusted means that the 
third party can obtain the main parties’ signatures while 
trying to recover the signatures, while semi-trusted means 
that the third party can only help to recover the signature 
without revealing the signature to the third party because 
the third party may misbehave by itself. 
 
2 RELATED WORKS 
There are many protocols that based on CEMBS found in 
the literature. The CEMBS is first introduced in [1] by Feng 
Bao, Robert H. Deng and Wenbo Mao. In [1] two types of 
CEMBS is proposed, the first based on GQ signature scheme 
and the second based on DSA signature scheme, each one of 
these CEMBS certificates are based on offline TTP. In [2] the 
CEMBS is based on GQ with offline STTP by using blind 
decryption. Blind decryption means that the STTP partially 
decrypt the ciphertext where trying to recover the signature. 
GQ-based CEMBS has one severe flaw, for in this scheme 
only one component D of signature (d, D) is encrypted. And 
it is an observation that the verifier can recover D by the 
virtue of the publicity of d, and by calculation of the inverse 
of mod q, not mod n. It is just this flaw that is exploited in 
[6] to successfully break the fair exchange protocol based on 
this kind of CEMBS [3]. 
In DSA-based CEMBS have the following drawbacks: (1) 
CEMBS construction and verification involve a lot of 
calculations (that is why DSA is slower than RSA). (2) The 
structure of resulting CEMBS certificate is too complex and 
lengthy.  (3) The DSA is the standard used by (NSA) so it 
afraid to have a trap door. 
The CEMBS-based on RSA is first presented in [3]; the first 
disadvantage of this type of CEMBS is that it based on 
online TTP, which means that TTP is involved in each 
transaction. Finding such trusted third party is not easy and 
involving third party in each transaction may cause 
bottleneck. Furthermore the third party may misbehave by 
itself. The second disadvantage is there are more 
calculations in the constructing of and verifying of CEMBS 
certificate. 
In this paper a new RSA-based CEMBS is presented base on 
offline STTP. The third party is only involved when one of 
the main parties misbehaves or an error occurs in 
communication channel, this decrease the load on the third 
party. Also the third party is semi trusted, that is he cannot 
obtain the main parties’ signatures, he only help them to 
recover the signature when an error occurs. These features 
are implemented by using blind decryption. This RSA-based 
CEMBS is more efficient in computation and 
communication comparing with other signature schemes 
that used in constructing CEMBS certificate. 
 
3 FAIR EXCHANGE PROBLEM 
 
Fair exchange of digital signatures or documents between 
two distrusted parties (e.g. individuals or companies) is one 
of the major issues in e-commerce systems. A fair exchange 
protocol allows two potentially mistrusted parities to 
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exchange their digital signatures over the Internet in a fair 
way, so that either each of them obtains the other’s 
signature, or neither party does. 
 
4 REQUIRMENTS 
 
Client A: one of the main parties involved in the protocol. 
She is responsible for initiating the executing of the protocol. 
Client B: the second main party. He is responsible for 
executing the recovery sub-protocol when an error occurs. 
STTP: the semi-trusted third party, help the main parties to 
recover the signatures when one of the main parties is 
misbehave or an error occurs in the communication channel. 
  
5 NOTATIONS 
 
SKT, PKT Elgamal cryptography scheme private/public 
keys for STTP 
SKi, PKi Elgamal cryptography scheme private/public 
keys for Client i 
di, ei Client i's private/public key (Signature 
scheme)  
Mi Client i's message 
Si RSA signature on a message 
Wi, Vi Ciphertext of Elgamal cryptography scheme 
C Blind ciphertext of Client A 
ci, ri CEMBS certificate of party i 
H(.) One-way hash function 
Ni Modulus of RSA signature scheme for client i 
G Generator of nA 
Pi, Gi Elgamal parameters for Party i 
|x| Size of x in bits 
X || Y Concatenation of X and Y 
 
 
6 RSA SIGNATURE SCHEME 
 
RSA is proposed cryptosystem in [4] by Rivest, Shamir and 
Adleman. We can use this system as a signature scheme. 
 
RSA key generation. The signer chooses two large secret 
primes p and q, and calculates public modulus n as n = pq, 
selects number e, such that 0 < e < φ(n) and e is relatively 
prime to φ(n). Function φ(.) is Euler’s totient function. There 
exists an inverse d of e modulo φ(n), i.e. d = e−1 mod φ(n). 
The party’s public key is e and its private key d. 
 
RSA signing.  s  = md mod n 
Where s is the signature on m, m is the massage to be 
signed. 
RSA verification. To verify that s is really the signer’s 
signature on m, we verify if 
m = se mod n = yes or no 
If the result is yes then s is the signer’s signature on m. 
 
7 ELGAMAL CRYPTOGRAPHY SCHEME 
 
The Elgamal cryptosystem proposed in [5] is the 
cryptographic scheme that used by CEMBS primitives. 
 
Elgamal Key Generation. To generate the Elgamal system 
keys, first, a suitable prime P is chosen such that the discrete 
logarithm problem is difficult for integers less than P. The 
suitable PK, g, and SK are chosen where g is the gernerator 
of P and PK = gSK mod P. PK, g and P are then made public 
and SK kept private. 
 
Elgamal Encryption Process. To encipher the plaintext m, a 
secret random integer w is choosing such that w < (P - 1), 
the ciphertext is (W, V) 
Where W = Gw mod P and V = m PKw mod P. 
 
Elgamal Decryption Process. the decryption process is: 
m = C (WSK)-1 mod P 
 
8 BLIND DECRYPTION 
 
Blind decryption for Elgamal system can be done as follows. 
The ciphertext receiver (who has no SK) gives the decryptor 
(who has SK) only W while keeps V to himself. The 
decryptor computes WSK and sends back to the receiver. As 
a result, only the receiver but not the decryptor can obtain 
m. 
In our fair exchange protocols with offline STTP, B is the 
ciphertext receiver and STTP is the decryptor. 
 
9 SYSTEM INIZIALIZAITON 
 
Client A. client A chooses two prime numbers p, q so that 
|p| = |q| = 512, sets nA = pq and chooses g ∈ *nZ  to the 
generator of n.   eA ∈ *nZ  relatively prime to ϕ(n). Sets dA = 
eA-1 mod ϕ(n). eA is the public key for RSA signature scheme 
and d is the private key for RSA signature scheme. 
A chooses PA as a prime number so that |PA| = 1024. Let GA 
be the generator of PA, chooses SKA ∈ ZPA and sets PKA = 
GASKA mod PA. (PKA, SKA) is the public/private key pair. 
Client B. client B chooses two prime numbers p, q so that 
|p| = |q| = 512, sets nB = pq.   eB ∈ *nZ  relatively prime to ϕ(n). Sets dB = eB-1 mod ϕ(n). eB is the public key for RSA 
signature scheme and d is the private key for RSA signature 
scheme. 
STTP. chooses the prime PT so that |PT| = 1024, let GT be 
the generator of PT (order of GT is large). SKT ∈ ZPT sets PKT 
= GTSKT mod PT. 
 
10 CEMBS DEFINITION 
 
Let s be the signature on the public message m under d and 
(W, V) be the ciphertext of the signature s under PK. 
Let (r, c) be the CEMBS certificate, there exist a public 
verification algorithm. The receiver generates a blind 
ciphertext and then implements the verification algorithm. 
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If the result is yes, then (W, V) is the ciphertext s under PK 
and s is the signature on m under d. 
The STTP can help the receiver to recover the signature from 
the CEMBS certificate by blindly decrypt the blind 
ciphertext without revealing the signature to STTP. 
 
11 CEMBS GENERATION AND 
VERIFICATION 
 
Signing: Assume that m is the public message. s = md mod 
n is the signature on the message m. 
Encryption: choose w ∈R *PZ , the ciphertext is (W, V), where 
W = Gw mod P and V = s (PK) mod P. 
 
CEMBS Generation: choose u ∈R *nZ , |u| = 400 
c = H (g || W || C || a || A) 
Where C = gV, a = Gu, A = (GPK)u 
r = u – cw 
the CEMBS certificate is r and c 
 
CEMBS verification: we check whether 
c ?= H(g || W || C || GrWc || (GPK)r (WPK)c) 
 
12 PROOF OF CORRECTNESS 
 
The correctness of RSA-based CEMBS is ensured by proving 
the correctness of the CEMBS generation and verification. 
 
We have 
gu = g(r + cw)   = gr gcw    = gr (gw)c    = gr Wc 
Also we have 
(gPK)
u  = (gPK)(r + cw)  = (gPK)r (gPK) = (gPK)r ((gPK)w)
c
 
            = (gPK)r ((gw)PK)
c
 = (gPK)r (WPK)c 
 
 
13 PROTOCOL 1: FAIR EXCHANGE OF 
SIGNATURES ON A COMMON MESSAGE 
 
This section explains the implementation of  the proposed 
CEMBS on a common message m. 
 
Basic sub-protocol steps 
 
1. A computes her signature sA, encrypts sA under STTP’s 
public key PKT to generate WA and VA, and generate the 
CEMBS certificate (r, c) 
sA = mdA mod nA  
WA = GTw mod PT where w < (P - 1) 
VA = sA (PKT)w mod PT  
cA = H (g || WA || C || 
a || A) 
Where u∈R *nZ , |u| = 400 
C = gV, a = GTu, A = (GTPKT)u 
rA = u – cAw  
 
A ? B: WA, VA, cA, rA 
2. B, upon receiving (WA, VA, cA, rA), sets blind ciphertext C, 
and checks whether  
cA ?= H(g||WA||C || GTrWAcA| (GTPKT)rA (WAPKT)cA) 
if the answer is ‘no’ then B stops the protocol. If it is ‘yes’, B 
computes his signature sB = mdB mod nB and send it to A 
B ? A: sB 
3. A, after receiving sB, checks whether sB ?= meB mod nB, if it 
is ‘no’, A stops the protocol; if it is ‘yes’ A sends his 
signature to B 
A ? B: sA 
4. B, after receiving sA, checks whether sA ?= meA mod nA. If it 
is valid, B accepts the signature and the protocol is ended 
successfully. 
 
Recovery sub-protocol steps 
 
1. If B does not receive any thing or the received sA is 
invalid, he sets the blind ciphertext C for A’s ciphertext and 
encrypts his signature under A’s public key eA, generates his 
CEMBS, and send each of A’s CEMBS certificate, A’s blind 
ciphertext, his ciphertext and CEMBS to STTP. 
 
C = gV  
WB = GAw mod PA where w < (P - 1) 
VB = sB (PKA)w mod PA  
cB = H (g || WB || VB ||  
   a || A) 
Where u ∈R *nZ , |u| = 
400 
a = GAu, A = (GAPKA)u 
rB = u – cBw  
 
B ? STTP: WA, C, cA, rA, WB, VB, cB, rB 
 
2. STTP, upon receiving the two ciphertexts and CEMBS 
certificates, verify the two CEMBS,  
cA ?= H(g || WA || C || GTrWAcA || (GTPKT)rA (WAPKT)cA) 
cB ?= H(g || WB || VB || GArBWBcB || (GAPKA)rB (WAPKA)cB) 
if the verification is OK then he blindly decrypt the blind 
ciphertext of A and send the blind decryption of A’s 
signature to B, and B’s ciphertext to A 
 
STTP ? B: (WA)SKT 
STTP ? A: WB, VB 
3. B, receives the blind ciphertext of A and perform the 
remaining decryption to recover sA, and then check the sA 
validity. 
A receives the B’s ciphertext, decrypt it to obtain sB. 
 
14 PROTOCOL 2: FAIR EXCHANGE OF 
SIGNATURE ON DIFFERENT FILES 
 
Here it is assumed that A and B have agreed on two files MA 
and MB. Client A sign the mA where mA = MA || H(MB) and 
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Client B sign  mB  where mB = MB || H(MA). The steps of 
the basic and recovery subprotocols are same as Protocol 1. 
 
15 PROTOCOL 3: FAIR EXCHANGE OF 
CONFIDENTIAL DATA AND SIGNATURE 
 
This protocol is used to exchange confidential data and a 
signature on the message between A and B. The protocol 
lets B send a message M to A in the exchange for A’s 
signature on H(M). 
 
Basic sub-protocol steps  
 
1. Party A computes her signature sA = (h(M))dA mod nA and 
the ciphertext WA and VA. A then generates CEMBS (rA, cA). 
A sends 
A ? B: WA, VA, cA, rA 
2. B, receive (WA, VA, cA, r=), converts VA to blind ciphertext 
C checks whether the CEMBS certificate is valid. If it is 
valid, B sends 
B ? A : M 
otherwise, B stops the protocol. 
3. After receiving M, A checks whether it matches h(M). If 
yes, A sends 
A ? B : sA 
Otherwise, A does nothing. 
4. B receives sA and checks its validity. If it is valid, B accepts 
the signature and the protocol terminates. 
 
Recovery sub-protocol steps 
  
1. If B does not receive or receive an incorrect sA, he converts 
the ciphertext VA to a blind ciphertext C, encrypts M under 
A's public key, creates CEMBS and then send the two 
ciphertext and the two CEMBS to STTP.  
C = gV  
WB = GAw mod PA where w < (P - 1) 
VB = M (PKA)w mod PA  
cB = H (g || WB || VB ||  
   a || A) 
Where u ∈R *nZ ,  
|u| = 400 
a = GAu, A = (GAPKA)u 
rB = u – cBw  
 
B ? STTP: WA, C, cA, rA, WB, VB, cB, rB 
 
2. STTP, upon receiving the two ciphertexts and CEMBS 
certificates, verify the two CEMBS,  
cA ?= H(g || WA || C || GTrWAcA || (GTPKT)rA (WAPKT)cA) 
cB ?= H(g || WB || VB || GArBWBcB || (GAPKA)rB (WAPKA)cB) 
if the verification is OK then he blindly decrypt the blind 
ciphertext of A and send the blind decryption of A’s 
signature to B, and B’s ciphertext to A 
 
STTP ? B: (WA)SKT 
STTP ? A: WB, VB 
3. B, receives the blind ciphertext of A and perform the 
remaining decryption to recover sA, and then check the sA 
validity. 
4. A receives the B’s ciphertext, decrypt it to obtain M. 
 
16 SECURITY OF THE PROTOCOL 
 
It is easy to see that A and B obtains each other's signatures 
without any involvement of STTP. 
B has two chances to perform improperly. The first one is 
where B may send A an incorrect sB, but A can detect this 
and refuse to give sA to B. The second chance is right after 
receiving ciphertext and CEMBS certificate of A, B stops the 
protocol, goes to STTP, and asks it to decrypt WA in order to 
get sA while without giving sB to A, however STTP will open 
WA for B only if B gives correct WB, VB to STTP and STTP 
will forward it to A. 
A may perform improperly by giving B incorrect ciphertext 
and CEMBS certificate. If A performs improperly later by 
sending B an incorrect sA or not sending anything, B can ask 
STTP to decrypt WA and get A's signature. Note that STTP 
also sends B's ciphertext to A in this case. 
 
18 CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper a new RSA-based CEMBS is proposed. This 
CEMBS is constructed by using RSA signature scheme and 
Elgamal Cryptography scheme. It is used to convince the 
receiver that the encrypted message is really the sender’s 
signature while without revealing the signature to the 
receiver. The blind decryption is used to ensure that the 
third party can only help the client B to recover the client 
A’s signature without disclosing the signature to the third 
party. The third party is offline, i.e. only involved in the 
protocol when a problem occurs. 
A protocol is presented that enables two parties to exchange 
their signature on a common message. We can easily modify 
the protocol to exchange signature on a two different 
messages. To exchange on different messages, each client 
signs his/her own message on a different message, create 
CEMBS certificate, and send the signatures, the messages, 
and CEMBS certificates. 
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